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Modelling Inter-temporal Aid Allocation: A New
Application with an Emphasis on Papua New Guinea
SIMON FEENY* & MARK McGILLIVRAY
ABSTRACT This paper models the inter-temporal allocation of foreign development aid to
Papua New Guinea (PNG). A formal theoretical model of aid allocation is developed, in
which aid to any one country is determined jointly with aid to all other recipient countries. This
is recognized in the econometric application of this model, which involves simultaneously
modelling aid to a number of countries in addition to PNG. Results based on data for the period
1969–99 indicate that both recipient need and donor interest variables determine the amount
of foreign aid to PNG and most other countries under consideration.
1. Introduction
What determines the amount of foreign aid allocated to a developing country? It is
generally believed that humanitarian criteria play an important role and, if so, aid will
be allocated on the basis of relative need: the needier the country, the more aid it can
be expected to receive. It is, however, conceded that donor interests also play a role.
Most studies therefore use a range of donor interest and recipient need variables as
determinants of aid allocation. Various hypotheses are tested, almost always using
cross-country data. Most studies reject recipient need as a determinant of aid alloca-
tion. McKinlay & Little (1979, p. 243), for example, concluded that there are “no
grounds for asserting that humanitarian criteria have any significant direct influence”
on aid allocation. Similarly, Maizels & Nissanke (1984, p. 891) concluded that
“bilateral aid allocations are made … solely … in support of donors’ perceived foreign
economic, political and security interests”.
Some recent studies have attempted to model aid allocation using time series data.
This is a useful development. We need to know whether aid is sensitive to the needs or
developmental requirements of countries at a particular point in time; but we also need
to know whether aid responds to the needs or developmental requirements of individual
countries over time. In short, inter-temporal considerations are just as important as
spatial considerations. Examples of these studies include Gulhati & Nallari (1988) in an
investigation of the allocation of aid to eastern and southern Africa, Gang & Khan
(1990) for the case of India, and Gounder (1999) for the case of Papua New Guinea
(PNG).
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PNG is an interesting case study from several perspectives. It has received more aid
than any other South Pacific country, but unlike many of these countries it has
experienced significant economic and social decline during the last decade. It has also
received almost all its aid from a single donor, Australia. Gounder’s results contrast
sharply to those of most cross-country studies, in that recipient needs, but not donor
interests, are found to dominate the allocation of aid to PNG.
This paper also provides a time series analysis of aid to PNG. In doing so it
addresses an implicit assumption of all previous time analyses—that aid flows to each
country are determined independently of such flows to all other countries. This is a
brave assumption. All aid allocations are determined in the context of a broader
budgetary constraint. Increasing aid to one country, for a given total aid budget, must
lead to decreases in aid to at least one other country. Our econometric approach allows
for a situation in which aid allocations are jointly determined, but is not invalidated if
these allocations are determined independently of aid to other countries. The approach
involves simultaneously modelling aid to a number of recipient countries in addition to
PNG. Aid allocations for 10 other major aid recipients are modelled individually, along
with the sum of aid allocated to all other countries, for the period 1968–99. Results
indicate that both recipient need and donor interest variables determine the allocation
of aid to PNG and most other countries under consideration.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 a theoretical model
of aid allocation is derived. This model is subsequently applied to both Australian and
total OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) bilateral development aid
flows to the recipient countries under consideration for the above-mentioned period.1
Australia has typically provided more than 90% of PNG’s total annual bilateral aid.
Section 3 discusses the econometric procedure and data used in this paper. Section 4
presents and interprets the results, while Section 5 concludes.2
2. Theoretical Model of Aid Allocation
Few studies of aid allocation have derived a theoretical model of aid allocation prior to
their empirical estimation.3 Those that have, developed a model similar to the one
originally proposed by Dudley & Montmarquette (1976). In these models, the aid
decisions of donors are motivated by an aid impact function relating to recipient need.
The model developed in this section departs from that proposed by Dudley & Mont-
marquette by focusing on the behaviour of those actually responsible for allocating
bilateral aid among developing countries—bureaucrats within the donor aid agency. In
the case of Australia, these bureaucrats are the officials of the Australian Agency for
International Development (AusAID). Aid allocations are the outcomes of the deci-
sions of these people and it is therefore these decisions that aid models seek to explain.
Bilateral aid allocation is a complex task. Donor policy statements, especially those
of the larger donors, have tended to emphasize humanitarian, commercial and political,
and diplomatic and strategic objectives. This is typified by PNG’s largest aid donor.
The objective of Australia’s overseas aid programme is “to advance Australia’s national
interest by assisting developing countries to reduce poverty and achieve sustainable
development” (Downer, 1998, p. 4). The humanitarian objective of reducing poverty
and achieving sustainable development involves allocating aid either favouring those
countries in greatest need or those which can best achieve development outcomes. The
other objective, of advancing Australia’s national interest, includes the promotion of
commercial opportunities, allocating aid to strategically-located countries or those with
close ties to Australia and either rewarding or punishing countries for particular actions.
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The decision-makers of the donor aid agency are required to take into account and
weigh up these often competing mandates or objectives for aid. Their task is to ensure
that aid allocations are as consistent with these objectives as possible. However,
decision-makers have their own bureaucratic objectives. These include the avoidance of
conflict with their counterparts in other bureaucratic agencies (both in the donor and
recipient countries) and allocating aid in a reasonably expedient manner. These
overlapping bureaucratic objectives typically culminate in allocative inertia, in which
current aid is a function of that of previous periods.
A representative utility function of bilateral aid allocation decision-makers may
therefore be written as:
U f(CN), (1)
where CN is the subjectively measured concordance of the various mandates of the
bilateral aid programme. This variable is treated as a private good of the decision-mak-
ers of the donor aid administration.4 CN is defined more precisely as the sum of the
concordances from allocating aid to or among m recipient countries, as follows:
CNm
j1
CNjm
j1
CN(Aj, RNj, DIj, Bj), (2)
where CNj is the subjectively measured concordance of mandates achieved from
bilateral aid to recipient j, Aj is the absolute amount of bilateral aid from the donor
under consideration to j, RNj is the recipient developmental need for aid of j, relating
to the humanitarian concerns in this country, DIj is the level of the donor’s self-interests
in j and Bj is the bureaucratic expediency associated with allocating aid to this recipient.
RNj, Dj and Bj are each vectors of variables. All variables are for period t. Donor
self-interests relate to commercial, political, diplomatic and strategic considerations.
Typically, donor decision-makers strongly believe that the aid they administer is of
development benefit to recipients. Utility therefore increases unambiguously with the
amount of aid allocated to country j. The relationship between utility and recipient
need is more complex. It is generally agreed in donor circles that need is greater in
countries with low levels of development and large populations, and that donors should
respond positively to this need, irrespective of how well the recipient might use the aid
provided. However, in some circles it is agreed that aid should be given to those
countries which can use it best in terms of development outcomes, and these countries
tend not to be the poorest and largest. Often they are countries with small populations
and middle-level incomes.5 This implies that utility could either increase or decrease
with changes in recipient need.6 We posit, however, that the dominant view is that aid
should increase with recipient need. Decision-maker utility will also increase unam-
biguously with the donor self-interests in country j and the extent to which giving aid
to this country is bureaucratically expedient. It therefore follows that:
CN
Aj
0,
CN
RNj
0,
CN
DIj
0 and
CN
Bj
0.
Let the concordance function (2) be rewritten as:
0	 	1
0		1
CNjDIj Bj Ajj RNj 0	j	1
(3)
0		1
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The parameters are introduced in order to allow for diminishing returns. The par-
ameter j is introduced to reflect recipient-specific considerations in the determination
of aid flows. We return to this issue below.
The task of the donor decision-makers is to maximize the sum of the individual
concordances subject to a budgetary constraint. The donor agency faces the following
overall constraint:
TABIMOAC, (4)
where TA is the total aid budget, BI is the total bilateral aid programme, M is the total
multilateral programme (that is, the sum of funds allocated to developing countries via
multilateral agencies), OA is the total of funds allocated to developing countries via
other programmes (such as regional-wide, humanitarian, refugee and other such
assistance) and C is administrative costs not allocated to individual programmes. It is
assumed, ex ante, that each of the variables on the right-hand side of equation (4), like
TA, are pre-determined. Donor decision-makers are provided with an aid budget and
are unable to influence the size of this budget. Moreover, in a given year, donors are
unable to increase the size of their budget by reducing the amount of funds allocated
to multilateral agencies. Each of these variables are fixed shares of TA and there is no
substitution between them. It follows that equation (2) is maximized subject to:
BIm
j1
Aj. (5)
The Lagrangian can therefore be written as:
max Ljm
j1
DIj Bj Ajj RNj BIm
j1
Aj. (6)
The first-order conditions are:
L
Aj
jDIj Bj Aj1j RNj 0 (7)
and
L
 BI
m
j1
Aj. (8)
From equation (7) it follows that:
jDIj Bj Aj1j RNj (9)
Solving equation (9) for Aj yields:
AjjDIj Bj RNj 
1
1j . (10)
Taking the logarithms of both sides of equation (10) and adding an error term yields
the following estimating equation:
lnAj	0,j	1,jlnRNj	2,jlnDIj	3,jlnBj
j, (11)
where
	0,j
ln(j/)
1j
, 	1,j

1j
,
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	2,j

1j
and 	0,j

1j
,
Three comments on the model are warranted. The first concerns the recipient need,
donor interest and bureaucratic variables. The allocation of aid is subject to informa-
tional time lags. Allocations for any given year are determined by donors towards the
end of the preceding year. Decision-makers can only base these decisions on currently-
available information and, in the case of most variables, especially those relating to
need, this information will at best be for the year prior to that for which the aid is
allocated. It is assumed that donors base their current decisions using this information
so all explanatory variables are lagged and this also ensures that they are exogenous.
The second comment relates to the specification of the aid variable Aj. In this paper,
aid is measured in absolute terms, rather than per head of recipient population (per
capita). This has been an issue of some contention in the literature on aid allocation,
with most studies focusing on per capita aid. The prime purpose of a model of aid
allocation is to explain observed aid allocations; as such the specification or measure-
ment of the aid variable must ultimately rest on the most likely decision variable used
in practice by donor agencies. If the actual decision variable is per capita aid, the
constraint becomes:
BIm
j1
Aj
Pj
Pj, (12)
where Pj is j’s population. While equation (12) obviously reduces to equation (5), it
implies a rather cumbersome allocative decision-making process. It is much more likely
that aid is allocated in absolute terms but taking into account the population of
recipient countries. This is supported by anecdotal evidence. Aid administrators rarely
speak of per capita aid, and their agencies rarely report aid in per capita terms: the focus
is on absolute aid.7
The third comment relates to the recipient-specific parameter j. The implication of
this parameter j is that the 	 coefficients attached to the recipient need, donor interest
variables and bureaucratic expediency variables are allowed to vary across recipients.
This is institutionally realistic as a range of recipient-specific considerations can be
taken into account in determining aid to countries, such as the perceived effectiveness
of aid to country j or the relative skills of those administering aid to j in lobbying for
additional aid due to, say, an increase in its need. The former is likely to be the most
relevant. If, for example, aid is not perceived to be very effective in alleviating need, an
increase in the measured need of j might not result in as big an increase, assuming
CN/RNj0, as would otherwise be the case.8
3. Econometric Procedure
The attempted econometric advances of this paper are twofold. Similar to many
previous studies (including the time series studies of Gounder (1999) and Gounder &
Sen (1999)), it seeks to explain aid allocation to PNG using donor interest and
recipient need variables. However, it does not attempt to estimate separate donor
interest and recipient need equations. This approach, although prevalent in the litera-
ture, is problematic econometrically if one posits a priori that both recipient need and
donor interests influence aid allocation. If this is true, then both models are mis-
specified due to the omission of relevant variables.9 This paper models aid allocation to
PNG using an equation containing both recipient need and donor interest variables.
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Secondly, previous studies have implicitly assumed that aid allocations to recipient
countries are made independently of each other. Given that aid flows are allocated from
a pre-determined pool of funds, as equation (5) makes clear, this assumption is
incorrect. Aid allocations among j recipients are jointly determined. Given that aid
administrative agencies wish to spend the entirety of the aid budget, decreasing aid to
one country will result in an increase in aid to at least one other, and vice versa. It
follows that the error term of each equation will be correlated with the error terms from
other equations. This implies that for each equation the expected value of the error
term will be non-zero. This violates an assumption of the classical regression model and
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation will yield inefficient parameter estimates.
Estimates will not exhibit minimum variance and the corresponding t-statistics are
drawn into question. Given that the explanatory variables are exogenous due to their
lags, Zellner’s (1962) seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) procedure is an appropri-
ate method of estimating a system of equations simultaneously. Zellner’s SUR method
of estimation transforms the error terms of the two equations so that they have the same
variance and are uncorrelated.
Thus, aid is allocated simultaneously between recipients and the aid allocation
process must therefore be modelled using a system of equations. Each equation seeks
to explain aid allocation to an individual recipient and the error term of each equation
will be correlated with the error term of the other equations. Therefore, an equation
which explains the amount of aid distributed to PNG belongs to a system of equations
explaining aid to other developing country recipients. This system may be written as:
lnAj,t	0,j	1,jlnRNj,t i	2,jlnDIj,t i	3,jlnBj,t i
j,t
lnAk,t	0,k	1,klnRNk,t i	2,klnDIk,t i	3,klnBk,t i
k,t
.
.
.
lnAm,t	0,m	1,mlnRNm,t i	2,mlnDIm,t i	3,mlnBm,t i
m,t (13)
where
j1,...,k1,
k j1,...,m
i
1
cov(
j,t,
k,t)j,k,t.
Aj,t and Ak,t and are aid allocations to individual countries. There may be numerous aid
recipients, each represented by a separate equation up to Am,t. The assumption
cov(
k,t,
i,t)i,j,t indicates that there is contemporaneous correlation. That is, the error
terms of the equations are, at the same point in time, correlated. Estimating equation
(13) is a daunting task as it involves obtaining data for a large number of recipient
countries. More than 150 countries receive official development assistance (ODA), and
most donors, including Australia, individually provide aid to more than 100 recipients.
Some compromise is warranted, therefore. In this paper, the econometric model is
applied to: (i) Australian aid; and (ii) DAC bilateral aid. There are 11 recipient
countries under consideration in each case. These countries have been the largest
Australian and DAC ODA recipients since 1970 for which time series data are
available.10 These countries vary according to whether the model is applied to Aus-
tralian data or total DAC data. A further equation is included in the model which
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describes aid allocated to all other recipient countries. The following system of 12
equations is therefore posited:
lnAj,t	0,j	1,jlnRNj,t i	2,jlnDIj,t i	3,jln	j,t i
j,t
m
k j1
lnAk,t	0,k m
k j1
lnRNk,t i	2,k m
k j1
lnDIk,t i	3,k m
k j1
ln	k,t i
j,t ,
where (14)
j1,...,k1,
k j1,...,m
i
1
k12,
cov(
j,t,
k,t)j,k,t .
The first 11 equations in (14) describe aid to the top 10 largest Australian or DAC
recipients. The twelth describes Australian or DAC aid to all other countries.11
Careful consideration was given to the measurement of the aid variable. This paper
adopts the commonly used ODA measure for aid. Three feasible options are available:
net disbursements, gross disbursements and commitments. Commitments are the
amount the donor agrees to make available to the recipient during the relevant time
period. Disbursements are the actual amount of aid transferred from donor to recipient.
They are the amount of the commitment actually spent during the relevant time period.
Net disbursements are simply gross disbursements minus any repayments relating to
the previous period’s ODA loans. Commitments are primarily supply-side, determined
by the donor country. As equations (14) basically describe a donor decision-making
process, ODA commitments are the logical choice of dependent variable. Unfortu-
nately, Australian ODA commitment data appear to be erroneously reported to the
DAC, exhibiting large annual unexplained fluctuations. In this paper, Australian ODA
disbursements are used but ODA commitments are used for the model explaining total
DAC bilateral aid to PNG.
This paper largely follows McKinlay & Little (1977, 1978a,b, 1979), Maizels &
Nissanke (1984), Gounder (1999) and Gounder & Sen (1999) in terms of the
specification of individual recipient need and donor interest variables. The elements of
the recipient need vector are country j’s population, per capita GNP (current US
dollars), per capita GNP growth rate (per cent), balance of payments and “other” aid
receipts (current US dollars).12 The balance of payments variable is net of official
transfers and measured as a ratio of GNP. It is used as a measure of economic
performance, not of a gap which needs to be filled with aid inflows. Other aid receipts
relate to multilateral aid and bilateral aid from other donors in the model of Australian
aid to PNG and to multilateral aid in the model of DAC aid to PNG. Other aid is
viewed as a substitute for Australian or DAC bilateral aid, in the sense that countries
with low amounts of other aid ceteris paribus need more assistance. Alternatively, the
two inflows could serve as complements with bilateral donors topping-up other re-
ceipts, or vice versa. Dudley & Montmarquette (1976) labelled this a “bandwagon
effect”. The expected sign of the coefficient attached to other aid is therefore ambigu-
ous; so too are the expected signs of the remaining recipient need variables given the
reasoning outlined in section 2 earlier. The elements of the donor interest vectors are
the values of Australian and DAC investment, exports and arms transfers to country j
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measured in current Australian and US dollars, respectively. For reasons discussed
above, i was set to one for each of the above variables.
The bureaucratic expediency vector B contains a single element, a lagged dependent
variable. This is intended to capture a possible allocative inertia in the aid allocation
process, alluded to above. It is well known that donor agencies want to avoid large
year-on-year fluctuations in aid, given the administrative and political difficulties
involved. These difficulties relate to the rapid winding back of existing projects or
programmes or quickly identifying new ones, and the offence often caused to recipients
through significant year-on-year cuts in aid. One would expect, therefore, relatively
smooth aid flows over time, with 	3 taking small absolute values, possibly in the range
of zero to one (pure inertia would correspond to a value of one). This does not rule out
reductions in aid over time. Should this be the case, one would normally expect a
gradual winding back of the aid programme to the country concerned.13
Equations (14) were supplemented with additional variables. The first was the GNP
deflator, either the Australian deflator or donor deflators averaged across the DAC. The
inclusion of this variable is based on the reasoning that donors are sensitive to the real
value of their aid, and adjust allocations on the basis of the movement of prices. This
is not to say that allocations are determined in real dollar amounts, otherwise the
dependent variable would be measured in this manner, simply that adjustments are
made on the basis of concerns for the real value of allocations. Additional variables,
added to some but not all equations in (14), are binary dummy variables, intended to
capture major events in a recipient’s history which have influenced the provision of aid
from Australia and the DAC and are not captured by other explanatory variables. Such
events can cause structural breaks in the data and must be accounted for in estimation.
Dummy variables may differ for recipients depending on whether the model is applied
to Australian or DAC aid flows. A number of potential structural breaks were tested for
by the inclusion of dummy variables in the estimating equations. Only those dummies
whose coefficients were found to be statistically significant were retained. Details of
these dummies are given in the Appendix.14
Like many of the pre-existing studies comprising the aid allocation literature, we are
interested in whether a vector of recipient need variables and a vector of donor interest
variables determine aid allocations. We test, therefore, the joint significance of the
recipient need and donor interest coefficients, respectively.15 In the case of the first
equation of (14), this involves evaluating the null hypotheses that
H0: 1,1,j1,2,j … 1,p,j0
and
H0: 2,1,j2,2,j … 2,q,j0
using a chi-squared test. Further details are given below.
ODA, multinational aid, GNP per capita, population and investment data were
obtained from the OECD database (2000) and the Australian Bureau of Statistics.
Data on current accounts and exports were obtained from the IMF’s International
Financial Statistics and Direction of Trade statistics, respectively. Data on arms
transfers were provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) database. The relevant time period is 1968–99. This is the longest series that
could be constructed given data availability for Australia’s and the DAC’s largest aid
recipients.
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Table 1. Econometric results: summary statistics for Australian aid
allocation
Recipient country R2 21 22 23
Papua New Guinea 0.97 1331.59** 67.16**90.01**
Ethiopia 3.50*0.89 18.52**284.90**
36.97**Fiji 3.280.97 1032.43**
India 0.120.79 24.95**136.79**
Indonesia 0.98 1573.22** 34.86** 18.71**
Malaysia 0.98 2462.31** 122.56** 10.96**
Pakistan 2.010.68 18.58**94.57**
Philippines 0.98 1437.19** 11.90**24.19**
Samoa 0.92 412.87** 16.62** 2.89
Sri Lanka 0.530.8 9.80*141.82**
21.18**Thailand 28.70**0.97 1385.65**
All others 0.98 1463.35** 8.36**13.19**
*Significant at the 90% level; **significant at the 95% level or greater.
4. Results and Interpretation
The model of aid allocation developed in this paper is applied to two sets of data: (i)
Australian aid flows; and (ii) total (DAC) bilateral aid flows. All estimations were
carried out using the statistical package STATA 7.0. Each set of results is discussed in
turn.
4.1 Australian Aid Allocation
A summary of the results for Australian aid allocation is presented in Table 1.
Statistically satisfactory results were obtained. Chi-squared tests, which evaluate the
null hypothesis that the slope coefficients of the equations are zero, indicate that all
equations in the system are individually significant. R2s are generally high, ranging from
0.68 for the case of Pakistan to 0.98 for the cases of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines
and for the equation explaining the allocation of aid to all other developing countries.
Moreover, a Breusch–Pagan 2 test for independence exhibits a value of 97.36,
indicating that there is significant correlation between the error terms at the 1% level
of confidence. This result is important as it shows that using the SUR simultaneous
equation approach is validated and that using single equation OLS estimation is likely
to yield misleading conclusions.
The results provide evidence that Australia considers both recipient need and donor
interests in determining the amounts of aid allocated to PNG and most other develop-
ing countries. This result is in contrast to those presented in the numerous cross-coun-
try studies of aid allocation. This is based on the statistics 22 and 23, which test for the
joint significance of the coefficients attached to the recipient need and donor interest
variables, respectively. In the case of Sri Lanka, recipient need variables are significant
as a group at the 90% level of confidence. In all other cases, 22 is statistically significant
at the 95% level of confidence, highlighting the importance of recipient needs in the
Australian aid allocation process.
Equally interesting results were obtained for 23, given the overwhelming
significance previous studies have attached to the importance of donor interests as
determinants of aid allocation. In the case of Australia, results indicate that donor
interests are not important in determining the amounts of foreign aid to Fiji, India,
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Pakistan, Samoa and Sri Lanka. However, these results must be evaluated with the
knowledge that data availability restricted the number of donor interest variables which
could be employed in the model for all of these countries, with the exception of Fiji.
On balance, results suggest that Australia considers both recipient need and donor
interests when determining foreign aid amounts, and this is true for the case of PNG.
The results provided in Table 2 show that, as expected, Australia has provided less aid
in response to higher growth rates in PNG per capita GNP and less aid in response to
increases in aid to PNG from other donors and multilateral agencies. Interestingly,
Australian aid is positively associated with per capita GNP and the balance of payments
current account (as a percentage of GNP). The positive coefficient on the per capita
GNP variable suggests that Australia may reward increases in per capita income with
more aid due to a greater perceived return on its aid. Results also suggest that Australia
rewards PNG for improvements in its balance of payments position. In terms of donor
interests, the coefficients on the Australian investment and arms transfers variables are
statistically significant with the coefficients exhibiting the expected positive signs.16
Table 2 provides further results from applying the model to Australian aid flows. A
positive coefficient on the lagged aid variable indicates that inertia exists in the
Australian aid allocation process. This is the case for all countries under consideration,
with the exception of PNG and Samoa. A positive coefficient is also expected on the
population variable, and this result is confirmed for the cases of Ethiopia, Indonesia and
the Philippines at the 95% level of confidence and for India at the 90% level. However,
the negative coefficient on this variable for the cases of Fiji, Malaysia and Pakistan
indicates that increases in Australian aid have not kept up with population growth in
these countries.
Australian aid is allocated on a recipient-specific basis, with the country providing
more aid to some recipients which exhibit a greater perceived return to aid but not to
others. There are positive and significant coefficients on the per capita GNP variable in
six cases and a negative and significant coefficient for two. For the growth in per capita
GNP variable, four coefficients are positive and statistically significant but an equal
number are negative. Equally conflicting evidence is provided for the balance of
payments variable. Australia has reduced aid flows to India, Philippines, Sri Lanka and,
on average, to all other developing countries following improvements in their balance
of payments positions (relative to GNP), but rewarded improvements in this variable in
the cases of Ethiopia, Samoa and Thailand.
In general, Australia views its aid and aid from all other donors as substitutes. This
is indicated by the negative coefficient on this variable for the cases of PNG, Fiji,
Malaysia and Sri Lanka. However, there is evidence of a “bandwagon effect” in
Australia’s behaviour towards Pakistan and Samoa. First identified by the cross-section
study of Dudley & Montmarquette (1976), this effect has donors providing more aid to
recipients which receive more aid from other donors.
Table 2 provides strong evidence that Australia views foreign aid and its exports as
substitutes. There is a negative and significant coefficient on the export variable in five
cases and a positive coefficient only for the case of Ethiopia. This indicates that
Australia has decreased its aid to recipients which receive its exports as these exports are
already effectively serving the donor’s commercial interests. Other than the case of
PNG, the only evidence that the level of Australian investment is an important
determinant of Australian aid is provided by the equation explaining aid to all other
developing countries. Australian arms are positively related to its aid flows for the cases
of PNG, the Philippines and Thailand.
Finally, there is fairly strong evidence to suggest that Australia is sensitive to the real
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Table 3. Econometric results: summary statistics for DAC aid allocation
Recipient country 23R2 2221
Papua New Guinea 0.92 382.23** 24.58** 4.18
Egypt 19.93**0.92 32.24**397.17**
India 9.71*0.75 11.74**118.28**
Indonesia 10.92**0.76 16.44**111.38**
Israel 0.95 573.11** 48.52** 6.00
Kenya 0.88 242.83** 31.09** 4.58
Morocco 53.67**0.94 41.40**560.18**
Pakistan 0.71 99.14** 28.20** 48.44**
Philippines 0.96 1062.94** 20.75** 17.44**
Tanzania 21.30**0.97 56.79**943.58**
50.83**Thailand 13.58**0.96 726.03**
All others 0.99 3232.60** 16.06**14.42**
*Significant at the 90% level; ** significant at the 95% level or greater.
value of its aid flows. The coefficient on the Australian GNP deflator is statistically
significant in six cases, although for the case of Ethiopia it exhibits an unexpected
negative sign. All coefficients on the binary dummy variables are statistically significant.
4.2 Total DAC Aid Allocation
This paper now turns to the results for total DAC aid commitments to PNG and other
major developing country recipients. Again, statistically satisfactory results were ob-
tained. The chi-squared tests (21) depicted in Table 3 indicate that all equations are
individually significant, R2s range from 0.71 to 0.99 (in the cases of Pakistan and all
other developing countries, respectively) and a Breusch–Pagan 2 test statistic of 88.66
reveals that, once again, there is significant correlation between their error terms of the
equations.
The 22 and 
2
3 statistics suggest that, similar to Australia, DAC bilateral aid donors
consider both recipient need and donor interests in determining the amounts of aid
allocated over time to developing countries. 22 is significant for all equations estimated.
This is with a 95% level of confidence for all countries except India, where recipient
need variables are significant at the 90% level of confidence.
Donor interests are significant as a group in all equations except those explaining
DAC aid allocation to Papua New Guinea, Israel and Kenya. This suggests that despite
being an important determinant of Australian aid, donor interests are not important for
DAC donors as a group. The result is in contrast to Gounder (1999), who found that
recipient need and donor interests are important in determining aid amounts to PNG
using single equation estimation. This result is particularly interesting for the case of
Israel, a country commonly perceived as being politically and strategically important to
donors. Israel’s relationship with the USA is arguably one of the most intense between
a donor and recipient. Yet donor interest variables, as a group, appear not to have
influenced inter-temporal allocations to Israel and the same is true for Kenya.
Other results obtained from estimating the model for DAC aid are presented in
Table 4. In the case of PNG, results suggest that inertia exists in the DAC aid
allocation process. DAC aid flows to PNG have not kept pace with population
increases, but the country has been rewarded by donors for improving its balance of
payments position (relative to GNP). The positive coefficient on the multilateral aid
Modelling Inter-temporal Aid Allocation 113
T
ab
le
4.
E
co
no
m
et
ri
c
re
su
lt
s:
S
U
R
es
ti
m
at
es
of
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s
of
m
od
el
of
D
A
C
in
te
r-
te
m
po
ra
l
ai
d
al
lo
ca
ti
on
C
on
st
an
t
(	
0)
P
op
ul
at
io
n
P
er
ca
pi
ta
G
ro
w
th
in
D
um
m
y
D
A
C
B
al
an
ce
of
D
A
C
G
N
P
L
ag
ge
d
M
ul
ti
la
te
ra
l
D
A
C
ar
m
s
C
ou
nt
ry
D
A
C
G
N
P
(
1,
2)
P
er
ca
pi
ta
ai
d
pa
ym
en
ts
tr
an
sf
er
s
(
1,
1)
ai
d
ex
po
rt
s
de
fla
to
r
in
ve
st
m
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
s
(m
 1
,5
)
(
2,
3)
(
4)
(
1,
4)
(
3,
1)
(
5,
1)
(
2,
1)
G
N
P
(
1,
3)
(
5,
2)
(
2,
2)
P
ap
ua
N
ew
G
ui
ne
a
9.
41
**

0.
92
**
0.
10

0.
23
0.
34
*
0.
10
**
0.
02
0.
02
**
0.
01
0.
28
**
0.
25
0.
13
**

0.
32
**
(4
.1
5)
(
2.
96
)
(0
.6
3)
(
1.
14
)
(1
.8
3)
(3
.2
5)
(0
.1
8)
(1
.9
9)
(0
.3
0)
(2
.1
8)

1.
31
(2
.5
7)
(
3.
30
)
E
gy
pt

2.
30
0.
97

2.
72
**

0.
98

3.
64
**
0.
19
**
0.
59
**
0.
11
0.
04

0.
0
2.
32
**
(
0.
10
)
(0
.3
9)
(
3.
54
)
(
1.
07
)
(
2.
72
)
(2
.3
0)
(2
.5
0)
(1
.5
3)
(0
.5
7)
(
0.
32
)
(2
.7
8)
57
.2
6*
*

4.
35
**
1.
49
**

1.
31
*

9.
24
**

0.
06

0.
72
**
In
di
a
0.
27
**

0.
18
**

0.
08
1.
83
**

1.
24
**
(2
.6
1)
(
2.
38
)
(2
.3
6)
(
1.
90
)
(
2.
03
)
(
0.
76
)
(
2.
27
)
(2
.8
9)
(
1.
98
)
(
0.
77
)

3.
66
(
6.
37
)
47
.1
0*

4.
15
*

0.
26
0.
72
**

10
.2
6*
*
0.
02

0.
42
In
do
ne
si
a

0.
08
0.
11
*
0.
32
3.
00
**
1.
71
**
(1
.9
0)
(
1.
78
)
(
0.
77
)
(2
.1
6)
(
3.
23
)
(0
.1
4)
(
1.
46
)
(
1.
59
)
(1
.8
0)
(1
.4
2)
(4
.2
2)
(3
.2
3)

31
.3
1*
*
4.
52
**
0.
22

0.
15

6.
83
**
0.
16
**

0.
39
Is
ra
el

0.
01

0.
08
**
0.
45
**

0.
47
0.
46
*

1.
93
**

1.
03
**
(
2.
46
)
(2
.3
6)
(1
.0
8)
(
1.
38
)
(
5.
70
)
(2
.3
3)
(
0.
67
)
(
0.
18
)
(
2.
41
)
(4
.9
5)
(
0.
58
)
(1
.9
5)
(
7.
30
)
(
3.
92
)
32
.3
5*
*

4.
51
**
0.
75
**

0.
84

1.
94

0.
35
**
0.
13
0.
03

0.
08
**
K
en
ya
0.
15
3.
16
**
0.
67
**
(3
.8
2)
(
4.
26
)
(2
.0
7)
(
1.
61
)
(
1.
19
)
(
3.
03
)
(0
.2
7)
(0
.5
2)
(
2.
13
)
(1
.0
9)

4.
5
(2
.8
1)

54
.7
0*
*
6.
74
**

0.
58

0.
30
0.
06

0.
10
*
0.
41

0.
04
M
or
oc
co
0.
18
**

0.
69
**

0.
54
(
5.
40
)
(5
.4
6)
(
1.
56
)
(
0.
83
)
(0
.0
7)
(
1.
83
)
(1
.3
5)
(
1.
29
)
(7
.2
9)
(
4.
24
)
(
1.
12
)
P
ak
is
ta
n
26
.3
2*
*

2.
92
**

1.
07
*

1.
93
**
1.
45
0.
30
*
2.
29
**

0.
10
*

0.
28
**
0.
53
**

0.
43
1.
75
**
(2
.3
3)
(
2.
34
)
(
1.
94
)
(
3.
23
)
(0
.6
6)
(1
.6
6)
(5
.6
5)
(
1.
71
)
(
3.
24
)
(3
.8
7)
(
0.
73
)
(5
.5
3)
P
hi
lip
pi
ne
s
39
.3
3*
*

4.
54
**
0.
48

1.
49
**
2.
95
**

0.
27
**
0.
57
**

0.
14
**
0.
02
0.
13
2.
30
**
0.
72
**

0.
69
**
(2
.5
2)
(
2.
62
)
(1
.4
5)
(
2.
93
)
(1
.9
6)
(
2.
91
)
(2
.3
8)
(
3.
66
)
(0
.5
5)
(1
.2
6)

5.
63
(3
.3
4)
(
4.
64
)
30
.2
6*
*

4.
03
**
0.
57
**
0.
29
*

0.
21

0.
02

0.
33
T
an
za
ni
a
0.
09
**

0.
11
**
0.
21
3.
42
**

0.
37
**
(5
.3
1)
(
6.
03
)
(2
.8
0)
(1
.9
1)
(
0.
33
)
(
0.
30
)
(
1.
46
)
(2
.7
9)
(
3.
69
)
(1
.6
2)

7.
91
(
2.
66
)
39
.8
9*

4.
41
*
1.
42
**
1.
50
**
10
.6
1*
*
0.
56
**

0.
45
T
ha
ila
nd
0.
16
**
0.
11

0.
04
1.
55
**

0.
97
**
(1
.8
0)
(
1.
89
)
(2
.6
5)
(2
.0
8)
(5
.0
6)
(5
.0
0)
(
1.
15
)
(2
.7
0)
(1
.6
1)
(
0.
32
)

2.
47
(
4.
13
)
6.
06

0.
27
0.
19
**

0.
22
**
0.
36
0.
14

0.
51
**
A
ll
ot
he
rs
0.
13
**
0.
16
**
0.
40
**
1.
01
**
(1
.4
9)
(
0.
90
)
(2
.0
4)
(
2.
51
)
(0
.3
4)
(1
.0
0)
(
3.
20
)
(2
.9
1)
(2
.7
5)
(4
.0
7)

5.
65
*S
ig
ni
fic
an
tl
y
di
ff
er
en
t
fr
om
ze
ro
at
90
%
an
d
**
95
%
co
nfi
de
nc
e
le
ve
ls
,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
114 S. Feeny & M. McGillivray
variable lends support to a “bandwagon effect” of DAC donors, discussed above.
Results also suggest that DAC aid flows are positively associated with the level of DAC
investment in PNG.17
For other major aid recipients, the negative coefficient on the lagged DAC aid
variable reveals that allocative inertia has reduced the amount of DAC aid to Morocco.
This result reflects the scaling down of DAC donor aid to this country after controlling
for other factors. For Israel, Pakistan and the equation explaining aid to all other
developing countries, inertia exists in the allocation process. Results also indicate that
aid commitments have not kept pace with population growth in several countries. The
coefficient on population is negative and significant for eight of the aid recipients. Only
in the cases of Israel and Morocco have aid commitments increased with increases in
population.
From a needs perspective, one may hope that decreases in per capita GNP would
be associated with increases in aid commitments. Results indicate that this is true for
Egypt and Pakistan. However, for India, Kenya, Tanzania and Thailand, results
indicate that DAC donors respond to improvements in per capita GNP by increasing
aid. The same is true for the equation explaining aid to all other countries. As
mentioned above, this result is explained by donors tending to favour countries with
higher levels of growth due to a greater perceived return on their aid. This suggests that
donors provide aid to countries where it has the greatest developmental impact and is
further evidenced by positive coefficients on the growth in per capita GNP variable for
the cases of Indonesia, Tanzania and Thailand.
The coefficient on the balance of payments variable takes on an unexpected positive
sign for the Phillippines and Thailand in addition to PNG. This indicates that
improvements in the current account (relative to GNP) are associated with increases in
aid. Both these countries consistently recorded current account deficits up until the late
1990s, and the result is explained by DAC donors rewarding these countries for
improving their balance of payments positions. For multilateral aid, a “bandwagon
effect” appears to exist for Egypt, Israel, Pakistan and Thailand. However, DAC
donors have reduced the amount of aid allocated to Kenya, Morocco and the Philip-
pines in response to increases in multilateral aid provided to these countries.
The coefficients on the donor interest variables are expected a priori to be positive
and this result is confirmed in many cases. However, there are a number of coefficients
on the exports, investment and arms variables that are negative and significant. As
mentioned above, these results are explained by donors viewing aid and these variables
as substitutes. This explanation is particularly true for arms transfers where increases in
arms are associated with lower transfers for five of the aid recipients. Finally, the
coefficients on the DAC deflator were positive and significant in eight of the equations,
indicating that the DAC donors are sensitive to the real value of their aid and adjust
allocations accordingly. All coefficients on the binary dummy variables are statistically
significant.
5. Conclusion
This paper has attempted to model the allocation of aid to PNG, examining time series
data for the period 1968–99. The motives of all DAC donors in providing aid to PNG
have been investigated, in addition to examining the allocative behaviour of its major
donor: Australia. The paper’s main concern was to investigate whether recipient need
and donor interests have been important in allocating foreign aid to PNG. Aid flows to
developing country recipients are not determined independently from one another and
Modelling Inter-temporal Aid Allocation 115
a system of 12 equations was estimated simultaneously using the SUR approach.
Eleven of these equations related to the largest recipients of Australian or DAC total
official development assistance, for which data were available. The twelfth related to
aggregated aid flows to all other recipient countries.
Essentially, this paper has shown that it is important to account for the joint
determination of aid allocations and that failure to do so is likely to result in incorrect
inferences and invalid conclusions. Moreover, motives for providing aid are both donor
and recipient specific. Future empirical studies of aid allocation should therefore model
the allocative behaviour of a single donor to its numerous recipients using a simulta-
neous system of equations.
Results indicated that aid allocated to PNG does respond over time to developmen-
tal conditions within the country. This is true for Australian aid and total DAC aid to
PNG and to other major aid recipients. Vectors of recipient need indicator coefficients
were jointly significant in all 12 equations estimated in models for both Australian aid
and total DAC aid. While some individual need coefficients displayed signs that are not
entirely consistent with a needs approach to aid allocation, developmental criteria very
clearly influence the amounts of aid that PNG and other developing countries receive
over time. This evidence stands in sharp contrast to the results obtained by previous
studies, which indicate that aid is not sensitive to relative developmental conditions in
countries at particular points of time.
Results suggest that recipient needs are important in determining DAC and Aus-
tralian aid to PNG. This is encouraging since increasing aid flows to PNG in response
to increasing humanitarian concerns should assist in increasing growth and alleviating
poverty. Although it is not necessarily the case that aid allocated on a recipient need
basis will be more effective than if allocated according to donor interests, it is likely to
be true. It is also encouraging that DAC donors as a group do not consider their
interests when determining the amounts of aid to provide to PNG. The same can be
said for Australia alone and the country’s lingering donor interests could potentially
hamper the effectiveness of its aid.
Notes
1. Development aid, or official development assistance (ODA), is defined by the DAC as grants
or loans to developing countries which are: (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) have the
promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; (c) at concessional
financial terms (a loan must have a grant element of at least 25%). In addition to financial
flows, technical co-operation is included in ODA. Grants, loans and credits for military
purposes are excluded. Transfer payments to private individuals (e.g. pensions, reparations
or insurance payouts) are in general not counted. Only countries that belong to part I of the
DAC’s list of developing countries can receive ODA. The DAC, whose membership
comprises all major western aid donor countries, collects and reports aid flows on behalf of
its member countries. See OECD (1999) for further details.
2. In a similar study, Feeny & McGillivray (2002) used the same approach to model aid
allocated to PNG. However, only two equations were used. The first explains Australian aid
to PNG and the second explains Australian aid to all other developing countries.
3. Trumbull & Wall (1994), Wall (1995), Tarp et al. (1999), Lahiri & Raimondos-Møller
(2000), Feeny & McGillivray (2002) and McGillivray et al. (2002) are relatively recent
exceptions.
4. It could be argued that the bilateral aid decision-makers also derive utility from the impacts
of other programmes funded by the agencies in which they are located, such as the
multilateral aid programme. However, as the bilateral aid decision-makers have little or no
control over the allocation of these funds, this impact is exogenous with respect to the
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preferences of these people, and including such a variable in the utility function makes no
difference to the behavioural and estimating equation derived.
5. A number of studies have tested for what are referred to as the small and middle-income
“biases” in aid allocation, where aid decreases with population and increases with per capita
income over given ranges of these variables. See, e.g. Arvin (1998) and Arvin & Drewes
(2001) for recent evidence.
6. In recent years donors have increasingly adopted a policy of selectivity, providing more aid
to countries with perceived better policies. The sample used in the paper extends only to
1999. Subsequent attempts to model aid allocation, using data from the early 2000s
onwards, might need to take this into account.
7. These points were first noted in McGillivray & White (1993). Alternatively, the decision
variable could be aid shares, with aid measured as a percentage or ratio of the total bilateral
aid budget. Econometrically, using this measure or absolute aid makes very little difference
with only the constant term being affected.
8. This was also supported by preliminary econometric testing. This involved estimating
equation (11) as a simultaneous system of equations for a number of aid recipients, testing
cross-equation restrictions that 	0,1	0,2… 	0,m, 	1,1	1,2… 	1,m, and so on. These
restrictions were clearly rejected. Further details are available from the authors.
9. This is also a point originally made in McGillivray & White (1993). The relevant variables
omitted from the recipient need model are the donor interest variables, and vice versa.
Unless it can be shown that none of the donor interest variables omitted from the recipient
need model are orthogonal with the recipient need variables omitted from the donor interest
model, which is unlikely in the extreme, then it in turn follows that the error terms of both
models are not independent of their respective explanatory variables. The t-ratios, F-tests
and R2s resulting from separate estimation of the models are therefore invalid and the
conclusions based on these statistics are likely to be misleading.
10. Large recipients of Australian aid for which a long time series was not available include
China, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Cambodia, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. China and
Bangladesh have also been two major recipients of DAC aid, but data availability did not
permit a long time series. China started receiving aid from the DAC in 1979 and Bangladesh
in 1972 (formerly West Pakistan). However, all of these recipients are included in the
equation explaining aid to all other countries. Note also that Israel was no longer classified
as DAC part I developing county from 1997 onwards. However, it continues to receive DAC
“aid” (but not ODA) as a part II country on the DAC list, so it is included in the sample.
See OECD (1999) for further details.
11. This equation will clearly be subject to a number of econometric issues, arguably the most
serious being aggregation bias. Estimates of its parameters should therefore be treated with
more than the usual degree of caution. However, its role is purely econometric, being to
provide efficient estimates of the parameters of the other 11 equations in (14).
12. It should be noted that there is less than universal acceptance of income growth as an
indicator of need. For a discussion of this issue see, e.g., Mosley (1981) and McGillivray &
White (1993). Our choice was guided by the literature on aid allocation; most studies treat
this variable as an indicator of need.
13. See Gulhati & Nallari (1988) for a good discussion of inertia in aid allocation.
14. Among the structural breaks considered but ruled out in the final analysis were increased
support from the early 1990s for countries classified as low income or least developed or for
those located in sub-Saharan Africa and a possible diversion of aid from countries not
belonging to part II of the DAC list following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Further
details can be obtained from the authors.
15. The studies which have tested for the relevance of these categories of variables include
McKinlay & Little (1977, 1978a,b, 1979), Maizels & Nissanke (1984), Gounder (1999) and
Gounder & Sen (1999), and have done so by separately estimating recipient need and donor
interest models of aid allocation. The former are comprised by recipient need variables only
and the latter by donor interest variables. Conclusions regarding the overall significance of
these vectors tend to be based on the adjusted R2 of each model. However, this approach is
inherently problematic econometrically due to the reasons outlined in note 9.
16. For single equation estimation explaining Australian aid to PNG, the coefficients on the
growth in income per capita variable and balance of payments variable are insignificant. This
provides further evidence that the error term of this equation is correlated with the error
terms from other equations. The parameter estimates are therefore inefficient and the
corresponding t-statistics are invalid.
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17. For single equation estimation explaining DAC aid to PNG, the coefficients on the balance
of payments, multilateral aid, investment and lagged aid variables are insignificant. In
contrast to system estimation, this leads to the rejection of recipient need as a determinant
of aid allocation. This provides further evidence that the rejection of recipient need as a
determinant of aid allocation found by the previous empirical literature is likely to be due to
single equation estimation.
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Appendix
Table A1. Binary dummy variables (Australian aid)
Recipient country Explanation equals onePeriod for which variable
Build up of aid prior to independence1972–75Papua New
Guinea Skate Government—poor economic management1999
Ethiopia Unstable period—rebels attack Addis Ababba, Mengistu1992–94
flees, unstable coalition governs the country, Eritrea be-
comes independent
Border war with Eritrea1997 onwards
1984 onwardsFiji Jackson report called for a greater regional focus of the
Australian aid programme
1972–73India War with Pakistan
1984 onwardsIndonesia Jackson report called for a greater regional focus of the
Australian aid programme
1984–94 International student scholarships classified as ODA duringMalaysia
this period
Period of instability, with martial law and undemocratically1982–88Pakistan
elected government
Nuclear tests1984
Table A2. Binary dummy variables (total aid)
ExplanationPeriod for which variableRecipient country
equals one
Build up of aid prior to independence1972–75Papua New
Guinea 1999 Skate Government—poor economic management
Gulf warEgypt 1990–92
India 1990 onwards Liberalized economy
1998–99 Nuclear testing
Asian economic crisisIndonesia 1998–99
Israel Camp David agreement1978 onwards
US budgetary difficulties1995
1997 onwards Classified as part II country
Kenya 1982 onwards Post adjustment era
Political instabilityPakistan 1972–73
1985 onwards Post-Marcos eraPhilippines
Unable to disburse ODA in the preceding 2 years.1996
Tanzania Poor performing economy1981 onwards
Thailand Post-Vietnam war period1975 onwards

